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The Fight against Financing Terrorism: 
New Challenges and Developments in Hungarian Law
GÁBOR KOVÁCS–PÉTER NYITRAI
I. INTRODUCTORY 
The relevant Hungarian legal regime has been driven by the implementation of anti-terrorist 
sanctions brought by the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter: UNSC) and the 
European Council, the relevant domestic legislation has never been infl uenced by local 
experience. 
The relevant EC Regulations (e.g. 88 1/2002 and 2580/2001) are self-executing in 
Hungary (as in all EU member states). The relevant United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSC resolutions) 1267 and 1373 in relation to the freezing of non-banking/
fi nancial assets needs domestic implementation. The sanctions of the UN relevant bodies 
(qua non-self executing international rules) are formally only binding the states and not, so 
to say, the fi nancial institutions that will eventually freeze the accounts, it is obviously the 
state who is bound to simultaneously bear responsibility for keeping its international 
obligations and uphold internal rule of law.1 The pure administrative “black listing” 
procedure in Hungary is fully based on the blacklist of UNSC and the Council of the EU. 
The procedural and substantive standards currently applied in the international black listing 
procedure and its national implementation do not fulfi ll the minimum standards of the 
fundamental principles of human rights and the rule of law either. Hungary is facing the 
problem how to implement the various sanctions regimes whilst respecting their 
international obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: 
ECHR) and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter: UNCCPR) and 
how to implement procedural and substantive improvements aimed at safeguarding 
individual human rights and the rule of law, as a matter of credibility of the international 
fi ght against terrorism, in particular an appeal mechanism against sanctions imposed by 
United Nations and European Union bodies.
It is important to defi ne the social context in which legal regime imposed by the 
UNSC, the EU and the Hungarian Government, aimed at freezing assets and fi nancial 
1 According to Article 25 of the UN Charter, States have the obligation to implement 
enforcement measures adopted pursuant to Article 41, which obligation they perform in accordance 
with their national constitutional system.
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transactions of terrorist organizations and organs associated with anti-democratic political 
regimes should be treated and investigated (Pap 2006: 405–425).2 The debate over Islam or 
Muslim communities has not been a dominant issue in the Hungarian political discourse. 
There is no measurable public hostility towards the Muslim community, and, even after 
September 11 or March 11, Islamophobia appears to be an altogether marginal, if at all 
existent phenomenon or sentiment in Hungary. It is worth emphasizing that Hungary had 
two unrelated incidents where individuals were accused of maintaining terrorist connections: 
one case involved a Muslim religious leader (2004), the other, a non-nationalized immigrant 
doctor (2003).3
With regard to criminal statistics, it is important to note that up to the amendment of 
Hungarian Penal Code (HPC) in 2003 (The Act II of 2003) the incrimination of terrorist 
acts did not comply with the general characteristics of terrorism, therefore the cases 
recorded in criminal statistics were not truly terrorist acts.4 The previous wording of the 
Section 261 was as follows: “The person who deprives another person of his personal 
freedom, or seizes considerable material goods, and makes dependent the release of the 
person or the leaving in undamaged state, or returning, of the goods on fulfi llment of a 
demand addressed to a state organ or social organization, commits a felony, and shall be 
punishable with imprisonment from fi ve years to fi fteen years.” Some common crimes 
against persons or against property were judged as terrorist acts by courts, e.g. Decision of 
Supreme Court (No. 1999.439) judged as an act of terrorism when the jealous defendant 
deprived his partner, and his partner’s daughter of their personal liberty, and made their 
release dependent on the claim given to the police. In Decision of Supreme Court (No. 
1993.597) terrorist act was committed when the perpetrator threatened that he kills his kid 
unless the police negotiate with him. 
2 See detailed analysis on the social aspects in Pap 2006. 
3 These events received a considerable media attention but neither triggered a particularly long-
lasting or prominent public debate. The second case concerned a naturalized Jordanian-Hungarian 
dual citizen dentist who worked as imam of a mosque in Hungary, which was expecting a donation of 
470 000 euros from the Al Haramein Foundation (Saudi Arabia) as contribution to building a new 
mosque. According to media reports, US intelligence bodies has been watching the movement of this 
foundation’s alleged money laundering activities for years and believed that the foundation is closely 
linked to Bin Laden’s Al-Quaeda and has cell groups in several countries. The media also reported 
that the location where Tayseer’s mosque is registered is the same as for a company called FAB Ltd, 
owned by a Sudanese national by the name of Hassanein, who, according to The Washington Post, 
was involved in arms smuggling to Bosnian Muslims and associated with Usama bin Laden. The 
accounts were frozen but Mr Tayseer was detained and placed under preliminary arrest only in April 
2004, after someone reported to the police that on the fi rst day of Israeli President Mose Katsav’s 
visit, he was attempting to blow up the Jewish Museum in Budapest (the opening ceremony at the 
museum was part of the president’s programme). Although Katsav’s spokesperson in Jerusalem 
claimed that the attack was planned against the president of Israel, Hungarian police denied any 
connection between the visit and Tayseer’s arrest. Nevertheless, within a few weeks, due to the lack 
of evidence, the Prosecutors Offi ce dropped the case which was eventually based on just one fi nger-
pointing allegation, by an accuser who has had a long police track record and had been extradited 
from Hungary on two occasions. 
4 16 recorded terrorist acts under the Hungarian Penal Code (hereinafter: HPC), in force prior to 
2003, were committed between 2002 and 2006. (Source: www.police.hu). 
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II. THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In Hungarian national law, one cannot fi nd any special, comprehensive statute on the law 
against terrorism in general and fi nancing terrorism in particular. As far as the relationship 
between international and domestic law norms is concerned, Hungary follows a dualistic 
approach and therefore the relevant provisions are set forth partly in statutes implementing 
the content of the international conventions on terrorism and terrorist fi nance, article by 
article and word by word into the domestic law. Act No. LIX of 2002 implementing the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism serves as a good 
example of this type of statutes. As a related special statute, the Act XV of 2003 on the 
Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering is worth mentioning. Its objective is to 
prevent the laundering of the proceeds of criminal activities through the fi nancial system, 
the capital markets and other areas exposed to potential money laundering operations as 
well as to help combat the fl ow of funds fi nancing terrorism. This Act has implemented the 
regulation of the Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the fi nancial 
system for the purpose of money laundering and the Directive 2001/97/EC amending 
Council Directive 91/308/EEC. Other binding provisions are embedded in the Act No. IV 
of 1978 (HPC) aiming to fi nd harmony between the recent and the earlier adopted 
international instruments as well as the current national standpoints. Besides these norms, 
certain governmental decisions play a prominent role in the fi ght against terrorism and 
terrorist fi nance. However, these decisions have no direct binding effect on the individual 
but they are obligatory for certain authorities and other state actors.
In Hungarian law, the term “terrorism” has not been defi ned as such so far. 
Notwithstanding this fact, the term terrorist group has been identifi ed with a statutorial 
defi nition as set forth subsection 9 of par. 261 of the HPC. This defi nition is based on the 
concept of criminal conspiracy and regards a criminal group as a terrorist group in case it 
consists of at least three persons organized for a longer period of time, aiming to commit 
crimes set forth in subsection 1 or 2 of par. 261 of HPC in a coordinated action. It must be 
emphasized that only the Act No. II of 2003 has introduced an amendment to the old 
defi nitional scope of terrorist activity, broadening the sphere of criminalization more 
sensitive to the real nature and content of terrorist activities. 
Hungarian legal framework is less specifi c to the fi nancing of terrorism and it is based 
dominantly on the law against money laundering. Due to the fact that usually these criminal 
activities occur jointly and they have common roots as being special forms of organized 
crime, they could not be treated separately in every case. The Act LXXXIII of 2001 on the 
fi ght against terrorism, and the imposition of restrictive measures serves as a good example 
for this approach. The Act XV of 2003 on the Prevention and Combating of Money 
Laundering is ruling (in the same manner) the prevention of the laundering of criminal 
activities through the fi nancial system, the capital markets and other areas exposed to 
potential money laundering operations and the problem concerning the combat of the fl ow 
of funds for the sake of fi nancing terrorism.
Within the EU, Financial Intelligence Unit was set up under Council Decision of 17 
October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between fi nancial intelligence units 
of the Member States in respect of exchanging information to collect and analyze fi nancial 
information. In Hungary, the National Police Headquarters (hereinafter referred to as 
“ORFK”) has special competences within the context of international cooperation. From 
2008, the competencies and duties are gradually going to be transferred to the Hungarian 
Customs and Finance Guard (hereinafter: HCFG). The ORFK (or HCFG) may make a 
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written request to a service provider for data and information (that is considered to be a 
bank or business secret), which the service provider must supply, acting within its powers 
or in order to fulfi ll the written requests made by a foreign fi nancial intelligence unit. The 
ORFK (or HCFG) may convey the data and information obtained to a foreign fi nancial 
intelligence unit in order to perform its request, or otherwise at its own discretion if there is 
any information, fact or circumstance that may suggest money laundering with foreign 
involvement.
Government Decision No. 2112 of 2004 on the current tasks in the fi ght against 
terrorism has set up an Inter-ministerial Anti-terrorist Working Group with the aim of 
promoting the effective implementation of the relevant international obligations and the 
policies of the European Union. The head of this Group is, by offi ce, the Minister of Justice. 
The Working Group works together with the Counter-terrorism Coordinative Committee set 
up by Government Decision No. 2239 of 2005. The Committee’s main task is to exchange, 
gather and analyze information on suspicious terrorist activities collected by national 
security authorities in order to prevent the commitment of a potential crime of terrorism. 
The Committee is operating on the logistical basis of the National Security Offi ce and it is 
headed by the deputy director of the Offi ce in question. It must be emphasized that these 
Units do not have independent jurisdictional competence over terrorist fi nance cases, the 
jurisdictional authority is left to the ordinary authorities operating on the basis of criminal 
law statutes. Government Decisions No. 2112/2004. (V. 7.), and to the No. 2151/2005. (VII. 
27.) established a national fi nancial informational (FIU – Financial Intelligence Unit), an 
organ which supervises the suspicious fi nancial operations at fi nancial institutions. The 
cooperation is based on the network FIU.NET, which all EU member state units have 
already joined.5 
III. PREVENTION OF FINANCING TERRORISM
The Act XV of 2003 on the Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering prescribes the 
relevant AML preventive measures applicable to countering terrorist fi nance (CFT). The 
Act is in full compliance with international standards, in particular with Council Directive 
91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and with Directive 2001/97/EC amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC. 
Preventive measures to be taken by the so-called service providers are primarily based on 
the identifi cation obligation and reporting obligation.6 The list of service providers does not 
include civil, non-profi t organizations, but in this respect the transparency of the non-profi t 
5 The unit for the reporting and the transmission of the information to the foreign fi nancial 
information units is an organ within the ORFK.
6 Service provider: persons who are engaged in the territory of the Republic of Hungary in
 a) fi nancial services or activities auxiliary to fi nancial intermediation;
 b) investment services, activities auxiliary to investment services or investment fund 
management services;
 c) insurance underwriting, insurance agency or insurance consulting services;
 d) commodity exchange services;
 e) postal fi nancial intermediation services, postal money transfer, accepting and delivering 
domestic and international postal money orders;
 f) real estate agency or brokering or any other incidental services;
 g) auditing;
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sector is one of the cornerstones of the government’s anti-terrorist program. The Government 
Decision No. 2046/2007 (III. 19.), on the further tasks related to the fi ght against terrorism, 
puts a deadline in place with 31 December 2007 to review the legal environment for the 
non-profi t sector on the basis of the recommendation of the Financial Action Task Force 
(hereinafter: FATF) No. VIII.7
Important steps were taken within the Regulation (EC) No. 1781/206 of the European 
Parliament and the European Council of 15 November of 2006 on information on the payer 
accompanying transfers of fund. In order to ensure the transmission of information on the 
payer throughout the payment chain, the Regulation provides for a system imposing the 
obligation on payment service providers to have transfers of funds accompanied by accurate 
and meaningful information on the payer. 
Identifi cation obligation of the service provider means the procedure for checking the 
documents to identify the customer, the customer’s proxy or any authorized representative, 
and to record the data specifi ed in the Act in writing. Service providers must satisfy the 
identifi cation requirement when entering into a business relationship with a customer, with 
respect to such customer, his proxy or any other authorized representative. Service providers 
shall be allowed to carry out any transaction involving a sum amounting to two million 
Hungarian forints (being equivalent to cca. EUR 7000) or more in Hungarian forints or any 
other currency only for a customer, proxy or other authorized representative who has been 
positively identifi ed by the service provider. The obligation of identifi cation shall also apply 
when there are several transactions involved, which are in fact associated, whose combined 
value is two million Hungarian forints or more. In this case, the identifi cation procedure 
shall be carried out in connection with the transaction when the threshold of two million 
Hungarian forints is reached.
The particulars of customers required to be recorded in the identifi cation procedure are 
strictly defi ned in the Act.8 The obligation of identifi cation shall not apply to the insurance 
 h) accountancy (bookkeeping), tax consulting services whether or not certifi ed, or tax advisory 
activities under agency or service contract;
 i) casino operations;
 j) trading in precious metals, precious stones, articles, ornaments and jewelry made of precious 
metals and/or stones, cultural assets, works of art, or selling the above-specifi ed assets at auctions or 
on consignment;
 k) providing services of a voluntary mutual insurance fund;
 l) providing legal counsel or notary services;
 m) the customers of the entities defi ned in a)-l). 
7  The recommendation of FATF VIII separates these regulations into 4 groups: fi rst fi nancial 
transparency related; second related to the establishment document for the non-profi t organizations to 
keep the main aim of the organization; third to establish an administrative background to be able to 
track the real non-profi t organization related information. The FATF points as fourth administrative 
group to strengthen the control systems. Next to the internal control it is mandatory that the member 
states should constantly check the non-profi t sector. Based on the recommendation within the control 
processes the following parties need to be involved: national-security, other crime persecutor 
authorities, fi nancial institutions, tax authorities and the other parties from the fi nancial sector. 
(Source: Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: i.m. www.fatf-gafi .org.)
8 In the identifi cation procedure, service providers are required to record the following 
particulars of customers:
 a) natural persons
 1) given name and surname (maiden name) and, where applicable, married name;
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contracts. The service provider is not required to perform the identifi cation procedure with 
respect to a customer if it is a fi nancial institution registered in the territory of the European 
Union. With regard to any transaction for the exchange of currencies involving a sum 
amounting to three hundred thousand Hungarian forints (cca. EUR 1100) or more, the 
fi nancial service organization providing the exchange service shall be required to carry out 
the identifi cation procedure.
In the event of noticing any information, fact or circumstance that may suggest money 
laundering, if the identifi cation procedure has not yet been completed, the service provider 
shall establish the identity of the customer, proxy or other authorized representative 
regardless of the value limit. The service provider is not required to perform the 
identifi cation procedure of a client that is itself a service provider and registered in a country 
whose legal system is compatible with Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the 
use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering. The minister being in-
charge of justice matters is obliged to decree the list of countries whose legal systems are 
not compatible with Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the fi nancial 
system for the purpose of money laundering.
If the data of a customer or an actual holder cannot be identifi ed during the 
identifi cation procedure or cannot be obtained, the service provider shall not enter into a 
business relation and shall refuse to carry out the current transaction as well as all future 
ones. The customer is required to provide a written statement to the service provider as to 
whether he is acting in his own name or in the name and on behalf of the actual holder. If 
any doubt arises concerning the identity of the actual holder, the service provider shall 
request the customer to reconfi rm the identity of the actual holder. Service providers are 
required to take all reasonable and appropriate measures in order to establish the identity of 
the actual holder.
The service providers shall keep records of all cash transactions of two million 
Hungarian forints (cca. EUR 7000) or more (whether in Hungarian forints or in any other 
currency) to indicate the customer’s particulars. The service providers shall suspend a 
transaction where there is any suspicion of money laundering and if prompt action by the 
 2) address;
 3) date and place of birth;
 4) nationality;
 5) mother’s maiden name;
 6) number and type of identifi cation document;
 7) in respect of foreign nationals, the particulars listed in Points 1-6 that can be established 
from his identifi cation document and the place of abode in Hungary;
 b) legal persons and other, unincorporated organizations
 1) full name and abbreviated name;
 2) address of corporate headquarters and, for foreign-registered companies, the address of the 
Hungarian branch offi ce;
 3) principal activity;
 4) number of identifi cation document;
 5) name and position of authorized representatives;
 6) identifi cation data of agent for service of process;
 c) key information pertaining to and associated with the business relation and the transaction.
 If the customer is a legal person or other organization, the identity of such legal person or other 
organization shall be positively established in addition to that of the natural person acting in the name 
or on behalf of such legal person or organization.
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police is deemed appropriate to examine certain corresponding information, data or 
circumstance. In this case, the service provider shall immediately notify the ORFK to 
investigate the report. The transaction may be completed if the ORFK does not notify the 
service provider in writing (fax, letter, e-mail) within 24 hours concerning its actions. Under 
Section 10 of the Act, service providers shall retain the data and documents obtained in 
connection with discharging the identifi cation obligation and their copies, and the documents 
verifying the performance of the obligation for ten years from the date on which they were 
recorded or from the date on which the report was received.
Reporting obligation of service providers means the reporting of any data, information 
or specifi cs concerning suspicion of money laundering to the competent person, and the 
forwarding of this report to ORFK (see more details in point V). The ORFK (or HCFG) 
shall be authorized to use the information received only for the purposes of combating 
money laundering to the extent necessary, and shall retain the data containing such 
information for a period of ten years. The performance of the reporting obligation shall not 
be regarded as a violation of bank, securities, insurance, pension fund or business secrets or 
the violation of restrictions on the disclosure of data or information pursuant to either a 
legal regulation or a contract. Under Section 52 of the Act CXII of 1996 on the request of 
the National Security Offi ce, police or the prosecutor, fi nancial institution shall provide all 
particulars on the requested bank account, fi nancial transaction in written form in case of 
the plausible suspicion of terrorism. The fi nancial institution shall not inform the client 
concerned about the information process. 
The Act requires specifi c due diligence preventive measures to be taken in the 
organization of each service provider (Section 11). Accordingly, any service provider 
having ten or more employees shall operate an internal control and information system 
facilitating the identifi cation of customers in order to prevent business relations and 
transactions that enable or constitute money laundering. The service provider shall provide 
the conditions for employees to be educated concerning the legal provisions on the crime of 
money laundering, to recognize business relations and transactions that enable or constitute 
money laundering and to be able to proceed properly in cases in which money laundering is 
suspected. The service providers shall adopt internal regulations to be approved by the 
agency exercising state and professional supervision over service providers. The agencies 
exercising state and professional supervision over service providers shall, in cooperation 
with the ORFK and in agreement with the minister being in-charge of justice matters, 
establish guidelines and models for drawing up the Regulations.
The Regulations must contain the following:
a) guidelines to recognize information, facts or circumstances that may suggest money 
laundering,
b) the procedure for identifying customers,
c) a description of the internal procedure for identifying an account’s actual holder and 
the manner in which the customer shall make his statements pertaining to such person,
d) the procedure for carrying out the reporting obligation, including the internal 
control, information and data processing systems that facilitate such procedure,
e) the procedural rules and forms for reporting to the ORFK (from 2008 HCFG), and 
the form containing the data,
f) rules for handling and protecting data obtained through the identifi cation procedures 
or through notifi cations,
g) rules concerning the training and further training of employees,
243THE FIGHT AGAINST FINANCING TERRORISM: NEW CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENTS...
h) codes of procedure and conduct for specifi c events that are to be observed by the 
employees in direct contact with customers,
i) the respective sections of the Penal Code covering the subject of money laundering 
and a description of the confi dentiality requirements prescribed by legal regulation 
governing service providers.
The ORFK shall inspect whether the service provider operates in compliance with the 
requirements prescribed the Act with regard to identifi cation, reporting, data and document 
storage and the training and education of employees. From 2008, the competencies and 
duties are transferred to the HCFG. The powers conferred upon the ORFK (or HCFG) 
include the on-site inspection of documents concerning the identifi cation obligation and the 
reporting obligation of service providers as well as documents pertaining to the education 
and training requirement. If the fi ndings of the aforementioned inspections reveal any 
violation of regulations or any discrepancy, the ORFK (HCFG) shall order the service 
provider in question:
– to restore lawful operations and eliminate the discrepancies,
– to adopt the Regulations or make revisions in the Regulations in accordance with the 
statutory requirements.
The failure of reporting obligation constitutes crime under Section 303/B of the HPC. 
Any person who fails to comply with the reporting obligation prescribed by the Act on the 
Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering is guilty of felony punishable by 
imprisonment for up to three years. In accordance with the Act CIV of 2001, the crime of 
the failure of reporting obligation committed by an individual person shall be attributed to 
the fi nancial institution. Since June of 2007 failure by negligence has not been punishable, 
only intentional omission is punishable. If the failure to Comply with the Reporting 
Obligation does not constitute criminal procedure, the state or professional supervision of 
the service provider shall impose fi ne (HUF 10,000–100,000, which is equivalent to cca. 
EUR 30–300) on any service provider who repeatedly violates the obligations. The 
administrative decisions imposing a fi ne may be subject to judicial review. AML/CFT 
measures prescribed in the Act have been properly applied both with respect to due 
diligence as well as to customer processes. 
The basic principles of AML/CFT regulations and preventive measures come directly 
from the implemented legal regimes imposed by the UN Security Council and/or the 
relevant bodies of the EU. Due to the preventive character of rules, the legislative approach 
is a mixture of the evidence-based and risk-based philosophy. Suspending measures under 
Section 9 of Act XV of 2003 can be taken on condition that some evidence proving the 
suspicion of money laundering or the fi nance of terrorism have been produced. However, 
the restrictive measures imposed by government decrees only rely on international 
instruments, therefore there is no particular evidence-based or risk-based domestic legal 
policy behind this legislation. As far as restrictive measures taken in criminal proceedings 
are concerned, see point V.B. (penal procedure). It has to be noted that the new regulation 
(EC) No. 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the European Council of 15 
November of 2006 provides a risk-based assessment in its Article 10: “the payment service 
provider of the payee shall consider missing or incomplete information on the payer as a 
factor in assessing whether the transfer of funds, or any related transaction is suspicious, 
and whether it must be reported to the authorities responsible for combating money 
laundering or terrorist fi nancing”.     
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IV. FREEZING OF ASSETS
In Hungarian law, the following two processes of freezing9 and seizing of assets have been 
established: 
– the legislative-administrative restrictive measures that shall be imposed directly in 
government decree based on international obligation, and
– the restrictive measures of penal nature that shall be imposed in criminal proceedings. 
The sanctions ordering the freezing of funds and other fi nancial assets or economic 
resources against persons who commit, or attempt to commit terrorist acts or who participate 
in or facilitate the commission of such acts “arrived” in the Hungarian legal system with 
Act LXXXIII of 2001, an anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism package which 
(motivated far more by the European Union integration process10 than a fear of terrorism) 
contained a host of new measures and regulations intended to aid the global effort to combat 
terrorism, especially in the area of fi nancial sanctions and restrictions towards organizations 
and persons supporting terrorism. The Act authorized the government to issue decrees 
which for 90 days can enforce and impose fi nancial and economic sanctions posed by the 
UN Security Council or EU Council. The Act says that if the restrictive measure requires an 
Act-based enforcement, the Parliament shall take the appropriate legislative measure within 
90 days. Through the enforcement of EC regulations and UNSC resolutions, the government 
is entitled to introduce economic, commercial, fi nancial or other prohibition or restriction 
vis-a-vis states, foreign or domestic natural or legal persons. It is important that the 
legislative restrictive measure shall be based on an obligation to which Hungary is 
committed under international law UNSC resolutions, or ordered in the regulations adopted 
under Article 60 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, or in regulations and 
decisions adopted by authorization of these regulations, or ordered in the Council’s common 
position adopted under Article 15 of the Treaty on the European Union. Under Section 
261/A. “Violation of International Economic Restrictions”, any person who violates the 
obligation imposed on the basis of an obligation to which Hungary is committed under 
international law, or ordered in regulations is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for up to fi ve years (see more in point V). As sanction-type resolutions often carry severe 
restrictions on the right to property, or even criminal liability, an act of parliament would be 
the desirable medium for implementation from the constitutional law point of view. 
Government decrees implementing EC and UNSC resolutions contain that the general 
rules of administrative procedures should apply in the procedures freezing or seizing assets 
where the National Police shall act as a fi rst instance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs as 
the second instance. 
Designation lists: Government decrees (e.g. No 56/2002. (III.29.) on the restrictive 
measures based on international obligations in the fi ght against the terrorism) provide 
9 Concerning freezing measures under the Section 9 of the Act XC of 2003 the service providers 
shall suspend a transaction where there is any suspicion of money laundering and if prompt action by 
the police is deemed appropriate to examine certain corresponding information, data or circumstance. 
In this case, the service provider shall immediately notify the ORFK to investigate the report. The 
transaction may be completed if the ORFK does not notify the service provider in writing (fax, letter, 
etc.) within 24 hours concerning its actions taken in accordance with the Act on Criminal Proceedings. 
The 24-hour period shall not include Saturdays, Sundays and offi cial holidays.
10 It is especially noteworthy that in June 2001 Hungary was put on the FATF/OSCE blacklist of 
countries non-conforming in money laundering issues.
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designation lists. Financial rights, fi nancial means, properties of, and enterprises directed by 
person, group, fi rm or institution listed in the decrees are to be frozen. Bank accounts, 
fi nancial transactions related to frozen accounts, business shares shall also be included in 
the frozen assets. Decree designation list contained persons and organizations listed e. g. 
Regulation EC No. 881/2002.; Regulation EC No. 1210/2003.; Regulation EC No. 
314/2004.; Regulation EC No. 798/2004.; Regulation EC No. 872/2004.; Regulation EC 
No. 1763/2004. ; UN Security Council R. No. 1390 (2002). 
To summarize, the “Hungarian” blacklists are not criminal lists, the sanctions do not 
impose a criminal punishment of procedure but instead apply legislative-administrative 
measures. The sanctions are civil in nature. According to the defi nition proffered by the 
ECtHR in König case, the substance and the effect of the right under the domestic law of 
the State concerned must be examined. Freezing of assets appears to have a civil quality, 
but it also has a criminal character by limiting freedom of movement. Regardless of the 
characterization, which is open to debate, the fair trial guarantees under the ECHR, ICCPR, 
or customary international law are not met by the current UN and EU listing procedures. 
There is no type of hearing, public or private, before an individual or entity is listed. The 
absence of such a hearing necessarily precludes it from occurring before an “independent 
and impartial tribunal”, but, in any case, the members of the sanctions committees are not 
“independent and impartial”. A tribunal cannot meet those qualifi cations when the members 
serve multiple functions as both prosecutor and judge
Without specifi c restriction measure ordered by an Act of Parliament or a government 
decree (based on international obligation derived from EC or UNSC resolutions) on a given 
natural or legal person, a full fl edged freezing of assets can only be ordered in the course of 
criminal procedure or as part of an operation induced by international criminal cooperation. 
Under Section 159 of Hungarian Code on Criminal Procedure (hereinafter: HCP), 
during the whole period of criminal proceedings, sequestration shall be ordered by a judge 
either if the civil forfeiture is likely to be imposed as a result of the proceedings or civil 
claim was submitted and there is reasonable ground to suppose that the property may be 
deprived of the civil claim. Sequestration may also be imposed on legal persons. Under 
Section 160 of the HCP, special security measures shall be taken by police or prosecutor to 
ensure the prospective sequestration through the suspension of rights of disposition of the 
suspected person related to goods, real estate property, bank accounts, business shares, 
stock or any fi nancial means. Any fi nancial means obtained by a legal person shall also be 
subject to security measure. Irrespective of the matter of guilt, civil forfeiture shall be 
imposed to seize any fi nancial gain or advantage resulting from criminal activities, obtained 
by the offender in the course of or in connection with, a criminal act and any property that 
was supplied or intended to be used to fi nance the means used for the commission of a 
crime, the conditions required therefore or facilitating that – for the purpose of this criminal 
measure – any profi ts, intangible assets, claims of any monetary value and any fi nancial 
gain or advantage are deemed assets. This criminal measure shall also be imposed on legal 
persons.
The HPC lays down that for the purposes of all legal regulation promulgating an 
obligation ‘funds, other fi nancial assets and economic resources’ means the assets specifi ed 
in Point 1 of Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on 
specifi c restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to 
combating terrorism; ‘freezing of funds, other fi nancial assets and economic resources’ 
shall have the meaning conveyed in Point 2 of Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 
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2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specifi c restrictive measures directed against certain 
persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism.
No documented cases about charitable organizations listed or de-listed in government 
decrees implementing lists of EC regulations and UNSC resolutions can be found. One 
Hungarian case related to a charitable organization deserves to be mentioned that was 
charged with providing fi nancial support to terrorist organizations and in one way or another 
started off from bank reports. This case also shows the inconsistencies within criminal law 
and UNSC resolutions or EU-induced anti-terrorist legislation.
The fi rst case involved Kinan Haddad, a Syrian physician who had been working in 
Hungary for several years and was summarily expelled in 2003 after he had transferred 
money to a bank account for a charity that was linked to a terrorist organization. Following 
the bank’s report to the National Security Offi ce, Interior Ministry’s Immigration and 
Citizenship Offi ce summoned Dr Haddad, notifi ed him that the account number to which he 
made this donation was linked to Hamas, extradited him and told him he could not return 
for 10 years. Although he said he had not known who was behind the account, the National 
Security Offi ce insisted that as the account belongs to one of the cover organizations of 
Hamas, in such cases, expulsion is the only possible reaction. Because the action was taken 
without a proper investigation and Dr Haddad was not given an opportunity to defend 
himself and therefore was not afforded due process of law, the Helsinki Commission 
claimed that the Hungarian expulsion process confl icts with general human rights principles 
and leaves no room to mount a legal defense. (Some argued that the fact that Dr Haddad 
was separated from his wife, with whom they got married according to Islamic law, 
constituted a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.) Dr 
Haddad’s lawyer fi led appeals with several government agencies but received no replies. 
Commentators draw attention to the following controversy: were the national security 
charges well-founded, an ex-offi cio criminal procedure should have been initiated. As it 
was not done, the factual and legal basis for the extradition remains questionable.
V. PENAL MEASURES
With regard to the fi nancing of terrorism, the HPC contains special direct incrimination and 
more general indirect incrimination. 
The direct criminalization of the fi nancing of terrorism is placed within the Section 
261 of HPC (Act of Terrorism) in a sense that its mental and subjective elements are closely 
linked to the elements of a terrorist act, as principal crime. 
Indirect incrimination has a more extended scope, however, through the incrimination 
of illegal fi nances and the violation of related obligations, it relates closely to the terrorism, 
as such. We consider as indirect incrimination the money laundering and the violation of 
international obligations.
Under the Section 260 of HPC, two forms of the act of terrorism, as principal crimes 
are as follows: 
– any person who commits a violent crime against one of the persons referred to in 
Subsection (9)11 or commits a crime that endangers the public or involves the use of a 
fi rearm in order:
11 a) ‘violent crime against a person and crime of public endangerment that involves the use of 
fi rearms’ shall mean homicide [Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 166], battery [Subsections (1)–(5) 
of Section 170], willful malpractice [Subsection (3) of Section 171], violation of personal freedom 
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a) to coerce a government agency, another state or an international body into doing, 
not doing or countenancing something;
b) to intimidate the general public;
c) to conspire to change or disrupt the constitutional, economic or social order of 
another state, or to disrupt the operation of an international organization;
is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment between ten to fi fteen years, or life 
imprisonment. [subsec. 1]
Any person who seizes considerable assets or property for the purpose defi ned in Point 
a) and makes demands to government agencies or non-governmental organizations in 
exchange for refraining from harming or injuring said assets and property or for returning 
them shall be punishable according to Subsection (1). [subsec 2.]
Providing fi nancial means to abet an act of terrorism which was already commenced is 
considered to be an accessory form of perpetration of a terrorist crime (subsec (2) of Section 
21 of HPC). Accomplice is a person who knowingly and voluntarily helps another person to 
commit a crime. The item of punishment established for the perpetrators shall also be 
applied for the accomplices. After the attempt12 of the principal terrorist act, the previous 
agreement on fi nancing or the previous offer of it, in itself is also punishable as a form of 
accessory under the Section 21 of HPC. The person abetting the accomplice shall also be 
punished as accomplice of the perpetrator. 
With respect to mental elements, accessorial liability needs the mental and material 
elements of the accessory to be related to a given act of terrorism and to an individual 
perpetrator preparing or attempting an act of terrorism. The general aim of terrorist activity 
on the part of a person abetting others is not suffi cient to consider him/her as an accomplice 
except only if the abettor’s mental element fi ts the broader criminalization defi ned in subsec 
(5) of sec 261. Any form of fi nancing by negligence of a terrorist act is not punishable. 
Prior to the commencement of the terrorist act, its fi nancing is punishable under 
different forms of special preparatory acts in subsec. (4) of sec 261 according to which, any 
person who 
a) invites, offers for, undertakes the perpetration of terrorist act (subsec. (1) and (2)), 
or agrees on joint perpetration of terrorist act or  
(Section 175), kidnapping (Section 175/A), crimes against transportation safety [Subsections (1) and 
(2) of Section 184], endangering railway, air or water traffi c [Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 185], 
violence against public offi cials (Section 229), violence against persons performing public duties 
(Section 230), violence against a person aiding a public offi cial (Section 231), violence against a 
person under international protection (Section 232), public endangerment [Subsections (1)–(3) of 
Section 259], interference with public works [Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 260], seizure of an 
aircraft, any means of railway, water or road transport or any means of freight transport (Section 
262), criminal misuse of explosives or explosive devices (Section 263), criminal misuse of fi rearms or 
ammunition [Subsections (1)–(3) of Section 263/A], arms traffi cking (Section 263/B), criminal misuse 
of radioactive materials [Subsections (1)–(3) of Section 264], criminal misuse of weapons prohibited 
by international convention [Subsections (1)–(3) of Section 264/C], crimes against computer systems 
and computer data (Section 300/C), vandalism (Section 324) and robbery (Section 321);
12 If any of the crime listed in subsec. (9) of sec. 261 (see above) begins with special purpose 
prescribed in subsec (1) of 261 (see above), the act of terrorism is considered as attempted, i.e. the 
attempt of a homicide with special purpose prescribed in subsec. (1) or obtaining, possessing fi rearms 
or ammunition without a license with special purpose defi ned in subsec. (1) shall be punished as an 
attempt of a terrorist act.
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b) provides for the perpetration of a terrorist act (subsec. (1) and (2)) the conditions 
required therefore or facilitating that or fi nancial means or
c) gathers fi nancial means for the perpetration of a terrorist act (subsec. (1) and (2)).
Due to its preparatory form, incrimination under subsec (4) is applicable only prior to 
the attempt of the terrorist criminal act which was aimed to be supported. If the terrorist act 
was attempted, the person who previously provided fi nancial means shall be punished as an 
accomplice of the terrorist act (subsec. (1) or (2)). Attempt of the above defi ned sui generis 
preparatory acts is also punishable with the same item of punishment as it is established for 
the perpetration of the subsec. (4). 
Intellectual forms of perpetration, such as providing knowingly and voluntarily any 
advice or information, even in relation to the fi nancial conditions of the crime, 
a) if a terrorist act was attempted, it is punishable as accomplice of the perpetration of 
the terrorist act (subsec. (1) or (2)),
b) up to the attempt of a terrorist act, it is punishable under subsec. (4), if the advice or 
information facilitate effectively the prospective perpetration of the terrorist act (subsec. (1) 
or (2)). 
Under subsec. (4), per se incrimination of conspiracy for a terrorist act is punishable; 
however, if the conspiracy is directed only to the fi nancing act, it is not punishable in itself. 
Conspiracy for fi nancing operates if at least two persons agree on the joint fi nancing of an 
act of terrorism; a person invites another to fi nance a terrorist act or a person offers or 
undertakes to fi nance a terrorist act. The agreement with a member or the members of the 
conspiracy on the support (prior to the perpetration and without the actual attempt of the 
terrorist act) can not be considered as a punishable preparatory act. The preparation for 
supporting a preparatory act (defi ned in subsec. (4)) is in itself not punishable. However, if 
the agreement was made on providing support during the perpetration of a terrorist act, it 
shall be punished as preparatory act for a subsequent accessory role under subsec. (4). In 
other word, up to the attempt of terrorist act, the conspiracy is punishable only if the 
fi nancial support is offered or agreed to be provided during the perpetration of the terrorist 
(in this case it is considered as an undertaking or offering the contribution as accomplice 
during the prospective perpetration), otherwise, up to the attempt of terrorist act, the offer 
or the agreement in itself is punishable under subsec. (4), only if the offer or the agreement 
may effectively facilitate the prospective perpetration of the terrorist act (subsec. (1) or (2)). 
If the act of terrorism was effectively attempted, the previous agreement, offer or conspiracy 
related to either the support prior to the perpetration or a support to provide during the 
perpetration shall be punished as a psychical accessory act of subsec. (1) or (2). If the 
material support was provided as it had been agreed or offered, it is a material preparatory 
act up to the attempt of the act of terrorism, and it is an accessory act if the act of terrorism 
was attempted. 
It has to be noted that a person who offers or agrees on the fi nancial support prior to 
the attempt of the terrorist act needs to have special intention related to a given act of 
terrorism which is aimed to be committed by an individual. The person abetting perpetrator 
of the supporting or facilitating act prior to the attempt of the terrorist act is also punishable 
as accomplice of accomplice, and as accomplice of the subsec. (4). The general minimum 
requirement is that the support shall be directed to an individual or individuals involved in 
the preparation (or in a conspiracy) of a special act of terrorism. The general aim of 
conspiracy for a support of general terrorist goals without any mental relation to a special 
prospective terrorist act and individual or individuals involved in the given act does not 
fulfi ll the mental requirements to punish preparatory acts defi ned in subsec. (4).
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The per se preparation for the fi nancial support (i.e. gathering, obtaining or possessing 
money for support of a terrorist act without transferring it) is also punishable under special 
criminalization subsec. (4). In this respect, an overt act which proves that the fi nancial 
means were planned to be directed to the support of a terrorist act needs to take place. 
Moreover, it can be per se criminal act such as money laundering (see indirect incrimination). 
With respect to mental elements, supporting knowingly general terrorist goals of a 
person or persons does not fulfi ll the mental requirements of subsec. (4). The mental and 
material elements of the preparatory act need to be related to a given act of terrorism and to 
an individual perpetrator preparing or attempting the act of terrorism. The general aim of 
terrorist activity on the part of a person abetting others is not suffi cient to consider him/her 
as guilty except only if the mental element fi ts the broader criminalization defi ned in subsec. 
(5) of Section 261 of HPC. Any form of fi nancing by negligence of a terrorist act is not 
punishable.
It has to be added that the Section 137 of HPC provides a general defi nition of 
“criminal conspiracy” (“when two or more persons are engaged in criminal activities under 
arrangement, or they conspire to do so and attempt to commit a criminal act at least once, 
however, it is not considered a criminal organization”). The Section 137 is an interpretative 
rule for criminal conspiracy, not a sui generis incrimination of that, that is applied as a 
special aggravating form of certain crimes in HPC and is punishable as such only if the 
crime has already been attempted by members of the conspiracy.   
The special aggravating form of the preparatory acts occurs if any person who commits 
any acts defi ned under Subsections (4) for the perpetration of any of the criminal acts 
defi ned under Subsections (1) and (2) in a terrorist group or supports the activity of a 
terrorist group in any other form. Under subsection (5), this is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment between fi ve to ten years. “Terrorist group” means a group consisting of three 
or more persons operating in accord for an extended period of time whose aim is to commit 
the terrorist act defi ned in Subsections (1)-(2). 
Special aggravating element compared to subsec. (4) is that preparatory acts shall be 
directed to support a terrorist act prepared by a terrorist group. This aggravating form is 
applicable only prior to the attempt of the terrorist criminal act which was aimed to be 
supported. If a terrorist act was attempted, the person who previously prepared for providing 
fi nancial means to a terrorist group is guilty of accomplice of the subsections (1) or (2). It is 
important to note that perpetration of a terrorist act defi ned in subsections (1)–(2) in a 
terrorist group, in itself is not a special aggravating form of the principal subsections (1) 
and (2). However, the organized perpetration of a crime is considered as a general 
aggravating circumstance of the sanction in a way that the judge is entitled to raise the 
maximum item of the penalty by 50%. Organized perpetration means that a group of three 
or more persons collaborate to deliberately engage in an organized fashion in the given 
criminal act.
Some special mental elements are required compared to subsec. (4) in which the 
perpetrator has to know and foresee the intention of a given individual or individuals who 
are supported by himself/herself. Due to organizational links, under subsec. (5) the 
perpetrator has to know the common goal of the terrorist group whose member or members 
are aimed to be supported. The perpetrator must also know that the crime which is aimed to 
be supported is planned to be committed by a group consisting of at least three persons 
operating in accord for an extended period of time and whose aim is to commit terrorist 
crimes defi ned in Subsections (1)-(2). In addition, a perpetrator must be aware of the 
terrorist character of the crime supported which means that he/she supposes that the act 
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(which is effectively an act of terrorism) is a “terrorist one” or he/she realizes some typical 
elements of terrorist crimes in accordance with the common defi nition of “terrorism” that 
could be supposed to be known by each average person. This non-legal defi nition of 
terrorism is a subject of assessment that has to be made by the judge.13 In Hungarian judicial 
practice a guideline defi nition of terrorism that could be used as a yardstick of the average 
level of knowledge in searching for the content of the individual intention has not been 
commonly accepted and established yet.  
If the perpetrator of the preparatory act defi ned in subsec. (5) does not realize or 
foresee the “terrorist type” of crime which is planned by a terrorist group, he/she may be 
punishable for the ‘affi liation with organized crime’ (under the Section 263/C. of HPC) if 
the criminal acts which are aimed to be supported were effectively punishable with fi ve 
years of imprisonment or more. 
Any form of fi nancing of a terrorist act by negligence is not punishable. Negligence 
means that the perpetrator fi nancially supporting an activity is not aware that the related 
activity is directed to a terrorist act. 
The HPC has extended considerably the incrimination when considered the fi nancing 
related to a person who only threatens to commit a terrorist act as a specifi c crime. Under 
the general rule of the HPC, threatening to commit a crime is not considered as punishable 
attempt or preparation of the criminal act. However, in accordance with subsec. (7) of 
Section 261, threatening to commit a terrorist act is a per se criminal act of terrorism (a 
felony punishable by imprisonment between two and eight years), irrespective of how 
seriously the perpetrator takes the threatening. Providing fi nances or material means to the 
person menacing to commit terrorist act is an accessory act of the subsec. (7), however, if 
the accessory’s intention does extend to the support of a prospective act of terrorism 
prescribed in subsec. (1) or (2) too, it shall be punished as accessory related to terrorist acts 
defi ned in subsec. (1) or (2), on condition that the terrorist act is attempted. If the “terrorist” 
purpose can not be proven, the general criminalization of that is the threatening with ‘public 
danger’ under the Section 270/A of HPC, according to which a person who, in the presence 
of others, states an untrue fact suitable for disturbing public peace, that there is a menace of 
the occurrence of an event involving public danger, commits a misdemeanor and shall be 
punishable with imprisonment of up to two years, labor in the public interest, or a fi ne. The 
punishment for felony shall be imprisonment of up to three years, if the crime is committed 
by threatening with a radioactive substance.
The perpetrator or accomplice of any form of the Section 261 can be any person who 
has reached the age of fourteen at the time the act was committed. Under Section 4, 
Hungarian criminal law shall be applied to any act committed by non-Hungarian citizens in 
a foreign country, if the crime committed is to be criminalized under the strength of an 
international treaty (universal jurisdiction). The offi cial reasoning of the Act II of 2003 
introducing the present form of crime of a terrorist act into HPC referred explicitly to the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (which was 
implemented by the Act LIX of 2002) as the international legal basis of the criminalization. 
Due to this reasoning, Section 261 and related incriminations are to be judged under the 
universal jurisdiction of HPC.   
13 According to the International Convention of the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(New York) Article 2., it seems to be a good guideline defi nition for domestic tribunals in description 
of the common notion of term “terrorism”.
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Under subsection (8) of Section 261 ratione personae of the section is extended to 
persons (including family members) who have positive knowledge concerning plans for a 
terrorist act and fail to promptly report that to the authorities. This is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for up to three years. Any preparatory act defi ned in subsections (4) or (5) 
such as fi nancing the preparation of a terrorist act or a conspiracy for support of a terrorist 
act have to be seen as a plan for a terrorist act, thus a person who is aware of those 
preparatory acts shall be punished as the perpetrator of subsection (8) of Section 261. With 
this regard, the procedural exemptions of certain witnesses to make testimony (under the 
Sections 81 and 82 of HCP) are not exemptions regarding the general obligation for making 
report laid down in HPC. The defense council can not be interrogated as witnesses on the 
issues of which s/he was aware as defense council. The other procedural exemption is that a 
relative of the person charged in the criminal procedure and any person who would charge 
himself/herself or his/her relative with his/her testimony has the right not to make testimony. 
Those persons are obliged to promptly report to the authorities if he or she is aware of plans 
for a terrorist act. Procedural exemptions are applicable only to the procedure of evidences, 
but under the substantive criminal law, the defense council is punishable if knowing that his 
client is planning to commit a terrorist act remains silent, and a relative of the perpetrator is 
also punishable if he fails to report his family member planning to commit a terrorist act. 
In accordance with the Act CIV of 2001, the crime of fi nancing of terrorism committed 
by an individual person shall be attributed to a legal person on the following conditions:
If the crime was intended to make fi nancial benefi t for the legal person or resulted in 
fi nancial benefi t for the legal person and the crime was committed either 
– by head of business or representative or agent within the business activity of the 
legal person; or
– by employee or member within the business activity of the legal person and the 
crime would have been precluded if the responsible leader had accomplished his/her 
supervisory or control duties; or
– by anyone if the crime resulted in fi nancial benefi t for the legal person and the head 
of business or representative or other entitled employee or member who was aware of the 
crime.
The attribution of the crime to the legal person requires a motion submitted by the 
prosecutor in the criminal proceedings. The following penal measures can be imposed to 
the legal persons: dissolution, restriction of its activity and monetary fi ne. The condition of 
the dissolution is that the legal person does not pursue any effective and legal for-profi t 
activity and it shall be established for covering crimes or its activity aims at covering 
crimes. 
As it was described previously, fi nancing of terrorism forming preparatory acts defi ned 
in subsections (4) and (5) is a sui generis form of incriminated preparation that does not fall 
within the scope of the general justifi cation rule of Section 18 concerning the preparation of 
a crime, although, sui generis preparatory acts are substantively the same as the elements of 
the general rules of preparation. For the above reason, instead of general justifi cation rule 
(subsection (2) of section 18.)14, the following special rule shall apply: in the phase of 
14 (2) Prosecution for preparation shall not apply against a person:
 a) who voluntarily discontinues his participation in the preparation before the act is committed;
 b) who withdraws his invitation, offer, undertaking with the aim of the prevention of the 
perpetration, or attempts to pursue other contributors to withdraw from the criminal activity, provided 
that the commencement of the perpetration does not take place for any reason whatsoever;
 c) who informs the authority about the preparation.
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preparation, the perpetrator of a criminal act defi ned in Subsection (4) or (5) shall not be 
liable for prosecution if he confesses the act to the authorities before they become aware of 
it and reveals the circumstances of the criminal act. It is also applicable if the accomplices 
of the “pentiti” attempt the crime jointly prepared. 
General justifi cation rules related to the attempt are to be applicable in a way that if the 
perpetrator attempts to commit any form of Section 261, including attempt of preparatory 
acts providing fi nancial means (defi ned subsections (4) or (5)), according to general rule of 
subsection (2) of Section 17., s/he shall not be liable for prosecution for attempt, if s/he 
voluntarily withdraws from the criminal activity before it is committed. If the attempt in 
itself constitutes another crime, the perpetrator shall be liable for prosecution for that crime.
In relation to withdrawal from any form of terrorist crime, special mitigating rule of 
Section 261 terrorist act shall be applied: the punishment of any person who:
a) abandons commission of the criminal act defi ned under Subsections (1) and (2) 
before any grave consequences are able to materialize; and
b) confesses his conduct to the authorities;
in such a manner as to cooperate with the authorities to prevent or mitigate the 
consequences of such criminal act, apprehend other coactors, and prevent other criminal 
acts may be reduced without limitation.
Financing of terrorism is often related to other specifi c crimes which constitute sui 
generis preparatory element facilitating providing fi nancial means to a terrorist act. 
Incrimination of violation of international and domestic economic restrictions aims to 
impose criminal sanction on the violation of anti-terrorist legal measures. Under the Section 
261/A., any person who violates:
a) the obligation for freezing liquid assets, other fi nancial interests and economic 
resources;
b) an economic, commercial or fi nancial restriction;
imposed on the basis of an obligation to which Hungary is committed under 
international law, or ordered in regulations adopted under Article 60 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, or in regulations and decisions adopted by 
authorization of these regulations, or ordered in the Council’s common position adopted 
under Article 15 of the Treaty on the European Union, is guilty of a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for up to fi ve years. The incrimination of the preparation is laid down in 
subsec. (4): any person who engages in preparations for the violation of any international 
economic restriction shall also be punishable for a felony by imprisonment of up to three 
years. The incrimination is extended to any person who has positive knowledge of 
preparations being made for the violation of any international economic restriction or that 
such a crime has been committed and is as yet undetected, and fails to promptly report that 
to the authorities. In this specifi c case, relatives of the persons committing the offense of 
misprision shall not be liable for prosecution. Unless otherwise prescribed by legal 
regulation promulgating an obligation or restriction under international law: a) ‘funds, other 
fi nancial assets and economic resources’ means the assets specifi ed in Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 (Point 1 of Article 1) on specifi c restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism; 
b) ‘freezing of funds, other fi nancial assets and economic resources’ are defi ned in Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 (Point 2 of Article 1) on specifi c 
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating 
terrorism.
253THE FIGHT AGAINST FINANCING TERRORISM: NEW CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENTS...
Due to a recent modifi cation, the scope of the AML incrimination became broader 
from June of 2007. Under section 303., “any person who transforms, transfers, uses in his 
business activity, undercover rights related to or place where the thing is located, or pursues 
any fi nancial activity or fi nancial service concerning a thing resulting from a criminal act 
punishable by imprisonment committed by another person, or seizes, handles, uses those 
thing, in order to conceal its true origin is guilty of felony punishable by imprisonment for 
up to fi ve years”. The previous incrimination was also maintained: “any person who uses 
things obtained by the commission of criminal activities punishable by imprisonment in his 
business activities and/or performs any fi nancial or bank transaction in connection with the 
thing in order to conceal its true origin is guilty of felony punishable by imprisonment for 
up to fi ve years”. New regulation also maintained the incrimination of ML conspiracy 
(subsection 5.) and a special justifi cation according to which the person who voluntarily 
reports to the authorities or initiates such a report shall not be liable for prosecution for 
money laundering, provided that the act has not yet been revealed, or it has been revealed 
only partially. Money laundering by negligence remained to be punishable (under Section 
303/A.) as follows: any person who uses a thing obtained from criminal activities punishable 
by imprisonment committed by others:
a) in his business activities, and/or
b) performs any fi nancial or bank transaction in connection with the thing,
and is negligently unaware of the true origin of the thing is guilty of misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment for up to two years, community service work, or a fi ne. Related 
special justifi cation was extended to ML by negligence: the person who voluntarily reports 
to the authorities or initiates such a report shall not be liable for prosecution for money 
laundering, provided that the act has not yet been revealed, or it has been revealed only 
partially.
AML Reporting Obligation: under Section 303/B., any person who fails to comply 
with the reporting obligation prescribed by the Act XV of 2003 on the Prevention and 
Combating of Money Laundering is guilty of felony punishable by imprisonment for up to 
three years. Up to the modifi cation of 2007, the failure by negligence to comply with the 
reporting obligation related to money laundering has been a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment for up to two years, community service work, or a fi ne. Since June 2007 
failure by negligence has not been punishable, only intentional omission is punishable. The 
Act XV of 2003 lays down the special reporting obligation (Section 1 subsec. 1.) on the 
basis of the Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the fi nancial system 
for the purpose of money laundering and on the Directive 2001/97/EC amending Council 
Directive 91/308/EEC. Reporting is legal duty for the persons being engaged in the territory 
of Hungary in 
a) fi nancial services or activities auxiliary to fi nancial intermediation;
b) investment services, activities auxiliary to investment services or investment fund 
management services;
c) insurance underwriting, insurance agency or insurance consulting services;
d) commodity exchange services;
e) postal fi nancial intermediation services, postal money transfer, accepting and 
delivering domestic and international postal money orders;
f) real estate agency or brokering or any other incidental services;
g) auditing;
h) accountancy (bookkeeping), tax consulting services whether or not certifi ed, or tax 
advisory activities under agency or service contract;
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i) casino operations;
j) trading in precious metals, precious stones, articles, ornaments and jewelry made of 
precious metals and/or stones, cultural assets, works of art, or selling the above-specifi ed 
assets at auctions or on consignment;
k) providing services of a voluntary mutual insurance fund;
l) providing legal counsel or notary services;
m) the customers of the entities defi ned in Paragraphs a)-l) (hereinafter referred to 
collectively as ‘service provider’), and any person who crosses the border of the Republic 
of Hungary;
n) directors, managers and employees of service providers and their participating 
family members.
The obligations of reporting shall apply to attorneys if they hold any money or 
valuables in custody or if they provide legal services in connection with the preparation and 
execution of the given transactions in accordance with the Act XI of 1998 on Attorneys:
a) buying or selling any participation (share) in a business association or other 
economic organization,
b) buying or selling real estate,
c) founding, operating or dissolving a business association or other economic 
organization.
If the failure to Comply with the Reporting Obligation does not constitute criminal 
procedure, the state or professional supervision of the service provider shall impose fi ne on 
any service provider who repeatedly violates the obligations.
There are some criticisms in relation to the criminal law framework stating that the 
system is producing a high volume of low quality over-reporting from fi nancial institutions. 
This regime appears to have led to a large amount of “defensive reporting,” rather than 
attempts to identify genuinely suspicious individuals, as very few of the reports have led to 
investigations and none to prosecutions. Out of 14 120 reports received in 2004, a small 
number, to be precise, only 20 cases turned into investigations.
The incriminations described above are punishable by imprisonment, community 
service work, or a fi ne as it was specifi ed to each specifi c crimes in the above points 
(principal punishments). The following ancillary punishments are also applicable: 
deprivation of civil rights, restraint of profession, suspension of driving privileges, 
banishment, expulsion, fi nes as ancillary punishment. Specifi c penal measures may also be 
applied independently and in addition to a punishment, namely confi scation and civil 
forfeiture. In terms of fi nancial outcomes of fi nancing activities related to terrorism, civil 
forfeiture needs to be dealt with in depth. Under Section 77/B. the following shall be subject 
to civil forfeiture:
a) any fi nancial gain or advantage resulting from criminal activities, obtained by the 
offender in the course of or in connection with, a criminal act;
b) any fi nancial gain or advantage obtained by an offender in connection with crimes 
committed in affi liation with organized crime;
c) any fi nancial gain or advantage that was used to replace the fi nancial gain or 
advantage obtained by the offender in the course of or in connection with, a criminal act;
d) any property that was supplied or intended to be used to fi nance the means used for 
the commission of a crime, the conditions required therefore or facilitating that;
e)  any property embodying the subject of fi nancial gain.
Any fi nancial gain or advantage resulting from criminal activities, obtained by the 
offender in the course of or in connection with, a criminal act, also if it served the 
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enrichment of another person, shall be seized subject to civil forfeiture. If such gain or 
advantage was obtained by an economic operator, it shall be subject to forfeiture. In the 
event of death of the perpetrator or the person profi teering; or when the economic operator 
was transformed, the property transferred by succession shall be seized from the successor 
in title. All assets obtained by the perpetrator during his involvement in organized crime 
shall be subject to forfeiture until proven otherwise. The property cannot be seized if that is 
reserved to cover any civil claim awarded during the criminal proceeding or that was 
obtained in good faith for consideration. Any profi ts, intangible assets, claims of any 
monetary value and any fi nancial gain or advantage shall be deemed assets.
Relevant procedural rules related to the civil claims for compensation are as follows: 
– civil claim for compensation can be awarded during criminal proceedings,
– if the property is reserved to cover any civil claim awarded during criminal 
proceeding, this can not be subject to civil forfeiture,
– during criminal proceedings, the judge may order sequestration of the property if a 
related civil claim was submitted and there is a reasonable ground to suppose that the 
property is likely to be deprived of civil claim. (Section 159 of HCP)
The Act CXXXV of 2005 on the aid for victims of crimes and the mitigation of 
damages by the states prescribes general measures with purpose to state-fi nanced 
compensation for all victims of any intentional crimes. The regulation is based on the EU 
Directive on the compensation of victims of crimes according to which each EU Member 
State shall ensure mitigation of damages suffered by EU citizens who became victim of any 
violent and intentional crime committed within the territory of the EU. Defi nition of a 
victim: all natural persons who suffered any kind of harm (physical, moral, fi nancial, etc.) 
resulting from any activity which is considered as a crime under the criminal law of any EU 
Member State. Persons entitled to be compensated shall be either
– EU citizens, or
– non-EU citizens, or 
– persons having permit of residence, or 
– any other persons who are victims of human traffi c, or 
– entitled to be compensated on the basis of a bilateral international agreement. 
The Act defi nes three principal services to be provided for victims:
– legal services in claiming for compensation,
– prompt fi nancial aid,
– legal advice.
Aid services and mitigations of damage shall be provided by the State Victims Aid 
Offi ce. Legal service shall be provided for the victim under the Act LXXX of 2003 on the 
Legal Aid. The prompt fi nancial aid is not provided automatically, its payment and its 
amount depend on individual circumstances of the given case. This is a lump-sum that is to 
mitigate the prompt damages therefore its maximum amount is 50% of the offi cial average 
individual income/per mount according to the National Statistical Offi ce (nearly EUR 500) 
(the so-called ‘basic amount’). The fi nal amount of the compensation may be up to 15 times 
greater than the basic amount. The compensation is total if the damages are less than 5 
times greater than the basic amount. The compensation is partial (max 75% of the damages) 
if the damages are between 5 times and 10 times greater than the basic amount. The 
compensation is max. 50% of the damages if the damages are more than 10 times greater 
than the basic amount. 
In Hungarian law, there are no provisions or practices regarding the use of confi scated 
or forfeitured assets for compensating victims of any crime.
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Another type of possible remedy is monetary compensation (Article 14(6) of ICCPR 
and Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR). To date, however, no court has allowed any 
type of “punitive damages” for compensation. Recently, for example, Sison applied to the 
CFI for compensation under Article 288 EC, but his claim was rejected.
Restrictive penal measures fully comply with national fundamental legal principles as 
well as international legal standards. Human rights problems relate to the freezing of assets 
done directly through legislation process implementing designation lists of EC regulations 
or UNSC resolutions. The procedural and substantive standards currently applied by the 
UNSC and by the Council of the EU, despite some recent improvements, in no way fulfi ll 
the minimum standards of the fundamental principles of human rights and the rule of law. 
The person or group concerned is usually neither informed of the request, nor given the 
possibility to be heard, nor even necessarily informed about the decision taken – until he or 
she fi rst attempts to cross a border or use a bank account. There are no procedures for an 
independent review of decisions taken, and for compensation for infringements of rights. 
Recent cases before the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the First Instance Court of the 
ECJ (CFI) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have raised serious questions 
about the UNSC and EU sanctioning procedures targeting individuals and entities. While 
no court to date has invalidated any national or regional measures implementing a UNSC 
resolution, the rising number of legal challenges suggests an increasing awareness of the 
procedures’ lack of protection for fundamental human rights. Hungary is facing the defi cit 
of protection for human rights in the UNSC and EU sanctions regimes and, in particular, 
the inadequacies of the listing and de-listing procedures and the lack of remedies. 
The fi nancial sanctions freezing funds and other economic resources impact on the 
right to property and right to work as defi ned under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
ECHR (right to property) and Article 6 of ICESCR (the right of everyone to earn their 
living by work). The most grievous human rights violation occurs in the sanctions regimes’ 
disregard for “fair trial” rights in their listing procedures. The Article 6 of ECHR guarantees 
a “fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law” in the case of both civil and criminal charges. If the state receives a 
Security Council resolution which is based on mostly unrevealed sources of information 
and political deliberations (invariably lacking fair trial guarantees), the state will be under 
an obligation to a) enforce these sanctions under its jurisdiction, while b) it will not be 
exempt from the rule of law obligation to respect the “presumption of innocence” principle. 
15 The constituent treaty of an international organization may not contradict jus cogens 
rules. From this it follows that the organs of the organization may not be empowered to 
15 The presumption of innocence is a fundamental right, laid down in the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU). Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) provides that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to Member States. The “presumption of 
innocence” is mentioned in Article 6(2) ECHR (The right to a fair trial): “Everyone charged with a 
criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law” and Article 48 
CFREU (Presumption of innocence and right of defense): “I. Everyone who has been charged shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 2. Respect of the rights of the defense of 
anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed.” For more, see, The Presumption of Innocence. 
Green Paper, Commission of The European Communities. Brussels, 26 April 2006, COM(2006) 174 
fi nal.
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violate rules of jus cogens.” In the landmark case of T-306/01 and T-315/01, 21 September 
2005 – Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation16 and Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi17 v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities’, 
the Court held that the European Community is competent to order the freezing of 
individuals’ funds in connection with the fi ght against international terrorism. However, 
insofar as they are required by the Security Council of the United Nations, for the most 
part, these measures fall outside the scope of judicial review.
The elements of the offence can be proved upon the general rules of Hungarian 
evidence law. Regarding to subsection 2 paragraph 4 of the Act XIX of 1998 on Penal 
Procedure, as a main rule, evidence beyond reasonable doubt is needed regardless of the 
fact whether the crime in question falls within the realm of terrorist offences or not. 
However, in practice, one can face the fact that in a relatively high number of the cases, 
criminal responsibility is declared to be proven on solely ‘hearsay evidence’. As for 
organized criminality, subsection 4 of paragraph 77/B. of the HPC institutes the reversal of 
the onus of proof concerning crimes committed in criminal conspiracy. According to this 
section, the burden is on the accused to prove the legality of the origin of property gained 
during the period of taking part in criminal conspiracy. Provided the accused fails to do so, 
all of his/her property gained in the period in question shall be confi scated upon the 
presumption of guilt.
Deciding whom to target and how to charge suspects is based predominantly on the 
information collected by intelligence units and other governmental bodies specialized in 
terrorism and organized crime. Government Decision No. 2112 of 2004 on the current tasks 
in the fi ght against terrorism has set up an Inter-ministerial Anti-terrorist Working Group 
with the aim of promoting the effective implementation of the relevant international 
obligations and the policies of European Union. The head of this Group is the Minister of 
Justice. The body works together with the Counter-terrorism Coordinative Committee set 
up by Government Decision No. 2239 of 2005. The Committee’s main task is to exchange, 
sum up and analyze the information on suspicious terrorist activities collected by national 
security authorities in order to prevent the commitment of a potential crime of terrorism. 
The Committee is operating on the logistical basis of the National Security Offi ce and 
headed by the deputy director of the Offi ce in question. The Directorate against Organized 
Criminality also provides its logistical basis available for the Committee.
It must be emphasized that these units do not have independent jurisdictional 
competence over terrorist fi nance cases; the jurisdictional authority is left to the ordinary 
law enforcement authorities operating on the basis of criminal law statutes.       
16 Applicants argued that Articles 60 and 301 of EC Directive, on the basis of which that 
regulation had been adopted authorize the Council solely to take measures against third countries and 
not, as it did in this case, against nationals of a Member State residing in that Member State. 
Applicants also denied the allegation that sanctions were imposed on them on account of their 
association with the regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In their view, the sanctions were not 
imposed on them because they maintained a link with that regime but because of the Security 
Council’s desire to combat international terrorism, regarded as a threat to international peace and 
security.
17  In support of his/her claims, the applicant has put forward in his application three grounds of 
annulment alleging breaches of his fundamental rights. The fi rst alleges breach of the right to a fair 
hearing, the second, breach of the right to respect for property and of the principle of proportionality, 
and the third, breach of the right to effective judicial review.
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Designation of the accused/suspects appearing on lists related to United Nations 
Resolutions relative to terrorism (in particular UNSC Resolutions 1267 and 1373) are done 
on government decrees implementing designation lists of EC regulations and UNSC 
resolutions. Restrictive measures freezing assets are based on the given government decree. 
Having regard that the designation is entirely based on the lists ruled by the EC 
regulations and UNSC resolutions, therefore the process and the criteria employed in the 
implementation of the designation are open as much as the legislation of the government is 
transparent. 
Before criminal or other charges, freezing of assets can be taken by government 
decree. The restrictive measure imposed in the decrees shall be in force until the overruling 
of the government decree, no limit of time is prescribed in this respect. In the EU and 
Hungarian law, there are no specifi c provisions allowing the use of frozen assets for daily 
and defense expenses. The remedy in case of freezing of assets without any criminal charge 
shall be directed against the restrictive measure taken in the government decree 
implementing EC regulation. The process of remedy is ruled in the Government Decree No. 
306 of 2004 on the exception process of the fi nancial restrictive measures imposed by the 
EU. The request for exception shall be submitted to the National Police Headquarters 
(ORFK) that has to take into account the position of National Security Offi ce and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the appeal authority is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The 
fi nal decision may be subject to judicial review. The conditions of exception are defi ned in 
the EU directives. There is no similar remedy provision for restrictive measures based on 
the implementation of UNSC resolutions. 
As has been highlighted in several international reports, individuals or entities listed 
under the UNSC sanctions regime are often even unable to appeal their listing, and have no 
access to any type of independent and impartial review mechanism. While individuals or 
entities listed under the EU sanctions regimes in theory have access to the courts, many 
cases demonstrate that the courts’ judgments will not always be implemented, creating a 
dangerous gap between theory and actual practice. It also appears nearly impossible to 
challenge the legality of the underlying UNSC resolutions and EU decisions – a situation 
that increases the responsibility on Hungary and other Member States to improve their own 
proceedings.
Provisions regarding the reparation of innocent suspects whose livelihood and 
reputation have suffered. Under Hungarian Civil Code, a person whose inherent personal 
rights have been violated shall have the right to get indemnifi cation for non-pecuniary 
damages (reputation, pain, distress, suffering, etc..) caused by another person in violation of 
the law. S/he shall be relieved of liability if s/he is able to prove that s/he has acted in a 
manner that can generally be expected in the given situation. Whether the government 
decree imposed the restrictive measure, or the authority in criminal proceedings, it is 
diffi cult to argue the legality of the measures, thus damage caused by criminal proceedings 
and indemnifi cation is unlikely to be subject of judicial procedures. The only possibility to 
get some compensation or reparation for non-pecuniary damage suffered by innocent 
suspects is the compensation by law (ex legem). There are no provisions on compensation 
by law if the restrictive measure were based on a government decree implementing 
international obligations. Section 580 of HCP allows reparation by law for suspected or 
charged person in case of acquittance or termination of process. They are entitled to get 
fi nancial reparation for custody, arrest (detention) on condition that the acquittance or the 
termination is based on one of the following reasons: 
– the subject of charge was not a crime,
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– the subject of charge could not be proven beyond all reasonable doubt,
– the perpetratorship of the charged person could not be proven,
– acquittance on the ground of excuses,
– statutory limitation,
– ne bis in idem.
The acquittance or the termination of process cannot be ground for reparation in any 
other cases. 
VI. FINAL REMARKS
The problem of terrorism in general, and particularly fi nancing of terrorism also belonged 
to the core issues of the debate on codifying a new, development-sensitive, comprehensive 
Criminal Code, which fi nally resulted in adopting the Act No. C in 2012 entered into force 
on the 1st of July 2013. The New Criminal Code essentially incorporates the relevant 
elements of crime of terrorism with the view to make the regulation more transparent. For 
the sake of this effort, the New Criminal Code splits the content of par 261 of the 1978 
Code into three parts, whereby it introduces the crime of ‘Terrorism’ (Section 314), ‘Failing 
to Report Plans for a Terrorist Act’ (Section 317) and ‘Financing of Terrorism’ (Section 
318).
In line with this codifi cation process, signifi cant developments have come to the fore 
in the fi eld of international judicial cooperation as well.  As for Hungarian law, extradition 
and mutual assistance is possible for the fi nancing of terrorism offence. This possibility is 
directly based upon Articles 11 and 12 of the International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism, as the Convention has been ratifi ed and implemented into the 
domestic law so far. Notwithstanding this fact, international judicial cooperation concerning 
terrorism fi nance can be based solely on paragraph 6 of the specialized Act No. XXXVIII 
of 1996 on international judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as Hungary does not make 
extradition and mutual assistance conditional upon the existence of a treaty between the 
cooperating parties. (However, the transfer of execution of foreign confi scation orders can 
be realized only upon specifi c mutual obligation set forth in an international convention). 
There is no need for requests or production of prima facie evidence for accepting and acting 
upon designations by other countries. According to the National Action Plan against 
Terrorism set by Government Decision No. 2112 of 2004, Hungarian law does not require 
any formal process through which names of designated individuals or organizations appear 
on domestic lists, rather Hungary automatically accepts the lists of European Council (EU) 
and UNSC resolutions. There are two processes where names of individuals or organizations 
designated by another country or international organization appear on domestic lists 
published or shared with law enforcement and non-state actors. List of natural or legal 
persons designated in EC regulation or UNSC resolutions are implemented in a government 
decree that has to be enforced and respected by each organ and individual, otherwise the 
crime of violation of international obligation occurs. List of natural or legal persons 
designated by other countries or international organizations shall be subject of regional or 
international cooperation in criminal matters ruled by special conventions and domestic 
rules. 
It must be pointed out that, in general, there is no any possibility to speed up 
international judicial cooperation proceedings on terrorism cases. Expedited response is 
only possible when the extraditee consents to his/her extradition, as in these cases the 
simplifi ed extradition proceedings apply (though this is also applicable in other type of 
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cases, as the emphasis here lies not on the nature of crime but on the fact of individual 
consent). The principle of double criminality is applied by the method of the analogous 
transformation of facts doctrine. Therefore, the Hungarian competent authority has to fi nd a 
substantially similar offence and it is not necessary to defi ne the offence in the same terms. 
As far as cooperation with other EU Member States is concerned, it must be emphasized 
that especially within the frame of European Arrest Warrant scheme-based cooperation, the 
requirement of double criminality does not apply as a main rule concerning crimes having 
signifi cant gravity, including fi nancing of terrorism. This rule was fi rst set by subsection 2 
paragraph 3 of the Act No. CXXX of 2003 in Hungarian law by implementing the Council 
Framework Decision on European Arrest Warrant (2002). The rule in question has been 
further maintained by subsection 2 paragraph 3 of the Act No. CLXXX of 2012 on 
cooperation with the EU countries in criminal matters replacing the aforementioned Act of 
2003. The political offence exception has been abolished within the frame of EU cooperation 
and within the scope of cooperation with non-EU states it is applicable on the basis of the 
‘Swiss proportionality theory’ embedded in paragraph 5 of Act No. XXXVIII of 1996 on 
international judicial cooperation in criminal matters. As the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism has been ratifi ed and implemented into the 
domestic law so far, directly on the basis of the Convention’s provisions, it is now forbidden 
for the Hungarian authorities to regard crimes of fi nancing terrorism as political offence. 
Section 28 of Act XXXVIII of 1996 on international judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
explicitly sets the principle of aut dedere aut judicare for extradition crimes in general. The 
principle ne bis in idem applies to all extradition crimes on the basis of paragraph 12 of the 
aforementioned Act, though in a restricted sense. A broader interpretation of the rule, where 
e.g. decisions of a third state also come into consideration applies only in the realm of 
cooperation with European Union states upon the Act No. CLXXX of 2012.
